LONDON — The deadly suicide attack at Brussels Airport
has reignited debate over whether aviation security should extend
beyond the departure gates to include public areas, providing more
safeguards at the expense of freedom and convenience.
The powerful bombs hidden in suitcases killed
and maimed travelers in the check-in hall who had yet to undergo the
rigorous screening designed to keep air travel safe.
As passengers moved around the bustling
departures and ticketing area, the three terrorists pushing luggage
carts went unnoticed. Yet at least one of them was a suspected ISIS bomb-maker linked to the Paris attacks who was being hunted by authorities.
The other bomber — Ibrahim El Bakraoui
— had been flagged to Belgian authorities as a suspected militant when
he was deported by Turkey in June. He was also convicted in 2009 of
shooting at police with an assault rifle.
Might they have been spotted if the terminal had
been protected by a wider security cordon, as happens at many airports
in the Middle East?
Similar questions were raised when a gunman
fatally shot TSA agent Gerardo Hernandez with an assault rifle at Los
Angeles airport in 2013.
The last major attack on a western European
airport was in June 2007, when a Jeep packed with propane canisters was
driven into the main entrance of Glasgow Airport in Scotland.
And in 2011, a suicide bomb in the busy arrivals hall at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport killed 37 people and wounded 173 others.
All three attacks took place in unsecured zones,
proving that even as most travelers associate airports with tough
security in the post-9/11 era, much of the space used by passengers is
little more secure than an ordinary street.
"It strikes me as strange that only half of the airport is secure,"
said Matthew Finn, managing director of independent aviation security
consultants, Augmentiq. "Surely the whole airport should be secure, from
the minute you arrive."
Some changes were made in response to the Moscow
and Glasgow attacks. In Scotland, terminal approach roads were
remodeled to add distance between the curb and the terminals, while
concrete posts were installed to thwart a vehicle-based suicide attacks.
At Domodedovo, pre-terminal security screening
was introduced — bringing it into line with airports in Turkey, parts of
the Middle East and much of Africa where passengers must pass a
checkpoint and a basic x-ray before they can access check-in or arrivals
areas.
However, additional checks not only add to the hassles for air
travelers but risk creating another line of people vulnerable to terror
attack.
"Any movement of the security 'comb' to the
public entrance of a terminal building would cause congestion,
inconvenience and flight delays, while the inevitable resulting [lines]
would themselves present an attractive target," said Ben Vogel, the
editor of IHS Jane's Airport Review.
"We call it transferred risk, where you are
simply moving the vulnerable point rather than eliminating it," said
Simon Bennett, director of the Civil Safety and Security Unit at
England's University of Leicester.
It is also costly. "Politicians cannot say it,
but security experts can - it would be prohibitively expensive to have
extra manned security checkpoints at entrances to airport terminals,"
Bennett said. "The cost would not be worth the benefits."
In Israel, where aviation security is regarded
as the most effective in the world, passengers are not automatically
screened before approaching airport buildings. Instead, they are subject
to profiling in which they pass through checkpoints manned by military
or security officials trained to spot and detain anyone most likely to
pose a risk.
However, profiling comes at a huge risk to civil liberties — with citizens picked on because of their race or religion.
Israel spends approximately 10 times more per
passenger on airport security compared to the United States, according
to former TSA Administrator John Pistole.
"And of course, Tel Aviv uses profiling
extensively to buy down risk, something our constitution prohibits us
from doing," he notes.
Supporters of profiling say it represents the best chance of identifying threats.
"We need to focus much more on behavioral
analysis, on negative intent, rather than prohibited items," said Philip
Baum, author of "Violence in the Skies: A History of Aircraft Hijacking
and Bombing" and editor of Aviation Security International.
"We need to reverse engineer the airport
experience so that the thing we normally do last - the bit at customs
where they focus on those people of greatest interest - comes at the
beginning.
"I'm a staunch believer in profiling, not racial profiling but identifying behavior that is not normal."
In the meantime, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security has stepped up patrols of airports while Customs and Border
Patrol recently implemented tougher visa restrictions on visitors who
have previously been to terrorism hotspots including Syria and Iraq.
However, unsecured airport zone remain "soft targets" — places such
as transit centers and malls where citizens might fear terrorism but
also value the freedom to move without restrictions.
Secretary of State John Kerry said after the
Paris attacks that ISIS and other groups was seeking to capitalize on
the unexpectedness of attack locations to maximize fear.
"Shopping malls, a restaurant — anywhere. The
idea is to make us believe that we are always going to be in such grave
and imminent danger that we actually have to stop what we're doing and
change our choices and change our way of life," Kerry said.
Yet permanent changes were made after previous
attacks. The shock of 9/11 led to a drastic toughening of security and
the introduction of pre-flight profiling in which authorities scrutinize
passenger lists before planes are given clearance to take off.
The 2006 transatlantic liquid terror plot
resulted in a ban on any containers larger than 100ml (3.5oz) — a regime
mocked by travelers as "the war on toothpaste" — while the 2009 failed
underwear bomber speeded up the introduction of body scanners that check
passengers for concealed explosives.
Baum said one welcome measure would be the greater use of plain-clothes law enforcement officers and behavioral observers.
"Governments want to do something after an event
like this," he said. "We are already seeing more armed police and
visible security. I hope they would do something that is actually less
visible."
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